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COPYRIGHT LAW—UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MUSIC WARRANT
ITS OWN SYSTEM: HOW ADOPTING THE INTENDED AUDIENCE TEST CAN
SAVE MUSIC COPYRIGHT LITIGATION
Alison P. Wynn*
Music has been a crux of everyday life for decades. Almost ninetyone percent of the United States population listens to music, and
spends more than twenty-four hours a week listening to their favorite
songs—making music one of the top forms of entertainment for most
Americans. Music has unique qualities that differentiate it from other
works of authorship, which must be recognized by copyright law.
The current subjective measure used to determine unlawful
appropriation of copyrightable work is not sufficient. A minority of
courts have expanded the current “ordinary observer” standard to
consider the “intended audience” of the specific work—claiming the
“ordinary observer” lacks the necessary skill and expertise to
properly test for subjective copying.
This Note will argue that the Intended Audience Test should apply in
all music copyright infringement cases as a better measure for
unlawful appropriation. A change in the subjective test is necessary
to foster a more accurate measure of malicious copying versus music
production with use of musical influences; to align with today’s
landscape of individualized and highly personal consumption of
music; and to better promote the main purpose of copyright law,
which is to foster the greatest amount and highest quality of creative
works in the public domain.

* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2017; Candidate
for M.B.A., Western New England University, 2017; B.B.A., Finance, University of
Massachusetts–Amherst, Isenberg School of Management, 2014; B.A., Communication,
University of Massachusetts–Amherst, 2014. My sincerest thanks to Heather Harris, Esq. for
her guidance and mentorship during the Note-writing process. I would also like to thank
Professor Art Gaudio for his support and enthusiasm during the development of this topic.
Special thanks to the staff of the Western New England Law Review for their efforts throughout
the production process. Finally, I would like to thank to my parents, John Wynn and Patricia
Furnari, for all their love and support during the toughest times—I would not be the person I
am today without them.
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INTRODUCTION
The hit song “Blurred Lines,” by Robin Thicke, Pharrell Williams,
and T.I., was at the center of a media frenzy in early 2015 due to the artists’
alleged infringement on the Marvin Gaye classic, “Got to Give It Up.”1
Faced with the threat of multiple infringement claims from Gaye’s family,
the trio filed a preemptive complaint for declaratory relief in 2013, seeking
confirmation that their song did not violate Gaye’s copyrightable
material.2 In the complaint, the artists detailed their respect and
admiration for Marvin Gaye, and their intent to “evoke an era” in the
production of the song—not maliciously copy Gaye’s work.3
Gaye’s family fought back by filing numerous counterclaims
detailing Thicke’s public admission to using Gaye’s song as inspiration
during production, the media coverage commenting on the similarities
between the songs, and an expert musicologist report listing a variety of
supposedly similar compositional features between the works.4 Gaye’s
original copyright protection extended only to the music underlying “Got
to Give it Up,” however, and not the sound recording, as the registered
copyright was based on a “lead sheet” of musical notation.5 Aside from
the lyrics, the lead sheet contained “virtually no original musical
expression, and it is immediately apparent upon seeing it that its symbolic
notation is a transcription by a literate musician of a sound recording of
quasi-improvised vocalizing involving no more than a handful of
pitches.”6 Regardless, the District Court denied Thicke and Williams’
preemptive claim and motion for summary judgment, and permitted the
Gaye family’s counterclaim for copyright infringement to proceed.7 The

1. Kory Grow, The ‘Blurred Lines’ Legal Battle Explained: What Comes Next, ROLLING
STONE (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www rollingstone.com/music/news/the-blurred-lines-legalbattle-explained-what-comes-next-20150320 [https://perma.cc/D7LF-MZ9M].
2. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 1306004 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
3. Id. (“Being reminiscent of a ‘sound’ is not copyright infringement. The intent in
producing ‘Blurred Lines’ was to evoke an era. In reality, the Gaye defendants are claiming
ownerships of an entire genre, as opposed to a specific work, and Bridgeport is claiming the
same work.”) (emphasis added).
4. Defendants’ Counterclaims at 15–16, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 1306004 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
5. Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing: Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of
Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1230 n.227 (2015) (“A ‘lead sheet’ is a score, in
manuscript or printed form, that shows only the melody, the basic harmonic structure, and the
lyrics (if any) of a composition.”) (internal quotations omitted).
6. Id. at 1230.
7. See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK, 2014 WL 7877773
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).
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trial began in February of 2015.8
During trial, Williams took credit for most of the production process
of “Blurred Lines,” claiming Thicke was only present after Williams
produced the majority of the music and wrote the lyrics.9 Williams
testified that the 1970s feeling of Marvin Gaye’s sound inspired “Blurred
Lines,” but pleaded that he never copied his work—adding that Gaye was
“one of the ones we look up to the most,” since he had grown up with
Motown music.10 Further, when asked if his song has a similar “feel” to
Gaye’s classic, Williams replied, “feel . . . not infringement.”11
After more than a year of legal battles, the jury ordered Williams and
Thicke to pay $7.4 million12 to the Gaye family for the infringement of
“Got to Give it Up.”13 The large damage award, the immense media
coverage, and the lengthy and detailed judicial process all demonstrate
today’s relevancy of music copyright law.14
In its aftermath, the “Blurred Lines” case “prompted debate in music
and copyright circles about the difference between plagiarism and
homage, as well as what impact the verdict [will] have on how musicians
create work in the future.”15 Critics of the current copyright system
suggests that, “[g]iven that the only commonalities between the works
were non-copyrightable generic musical and sonic elements, it appears
that the verdict was based mainly on the jurors’ opprobrium of the
8. See Austin Siegemund-Broka, ‘Blurred Lines’ Trial Opens As Jurors Hear Dueling
Arguments
About
What’s
At
Stake,
BILLBOARD
(Feb.
24,
2015),
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6480482/blurred-lines-trial-robin-thicke-pharrell
[https://perma.cc/Q46E-TNT5].
9. Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, Pharrell Williams Acknowledges Similarity to Gaye Song
in
‘Blurred
Lines’
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
4,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/business/media/pharrell-williams-acknowledgessimilarity-to-marvin-gaye-song-in-blurred-lines-case html [https://perma.cc/Z6F8-Y7CP].
10. Id. (quoting Pharrell Williams).
11. Id.
12. In a July 2015 post-trial decision, the District Court reduced the jury award to $5.3
million, but granted Gaye’s family 50% of future royalties from “Blurred Lines.” Williams v.
Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 4479500, at *47–48 (C.D.
Cal. July 14, 2015).
13. Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke to Pay $7.4m to Marvin Gaye’s Family Over
Blurred Lines, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
music/2015/mar/10/blurred-lines-pharrell-robin-thicke-copied-marvin-gaye.
14. Jon Caramanica, What’s Wrong With the ‘Blurred Lines’ Copyright Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www nytimes.com/2015/03/12/arts/music/whats-wrong-withthe-blurred-lines-copyright-ruling html [https://perma.cc/9VS7-BNQM].
15. Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, ‘Blurred Lines’ Infringed on Marvin Gaye Copyright,
Jury
Rules,
N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
10,
2015),
http://www nytimes.com/2015/
03/11/business/media/blurred-lines-infringed-on-marvin-gaye-copyright-jury-rules html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/89T3-SQE3].
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characters and veracity of Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams, as
depicted by Gaye’s attorney.”16 Williams also spoke out about the
negative impact this judicial decision will have on the future of music
production and creativity.17 An utmost concern is whether the decision
stretched the boundaries of copyright protection to include the “feel” or
“vibe” of the song—something inherently available for secondary users to
build upon.18
Fear that the “Blurred Lines” verdict would impede the future of
music production and artist creativity was the basis of Williams and
Thicke’s decision to file a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit at the end
of 2015.19 In conjunction with the appeal, over two hundred musicians
signed onto an amicus curiae brief in late 2016,20 detailing their collective
16. Cronin, supra note 5, at 1231.
17. Daniel Kreps, Pharrell Talks ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit for First Time, ROLLING
STONE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/pharrell-talks-blurred-lineslawsuit-for-first-time-20150319 [https://perma.cc/7F7D-G5KB].
The verdict handicaps any creator out there who is making something that might be
inspired by something else. This applies to fashion, music design . . . anything. If we
lose our freedom to be inspired, we’re going to look up one day and the entertainment
industry as we know it will be frozen in litigation. This is about protecting the
intellectual rights of people who have ideas. Everything that’s around you in a room
was inspired by something or someone. If you kill that, there’s no creativity.
Id. (quoting Pharrell Williams); Michael Miller, Pharrell on ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict: ‘There
Was No Copyright Infringement’, PEOPLE (Mar. 20, 2015, 7:25 PM),
http://www.people.com/article/pharrell-speaks-blurred-lines-no-copyright-infringement
[https://perma.cc/QW68-ZW6K] (“If that verdict stands, people can’t be inspired by anything,
companies can’t be inspired by anything, or else they’re liable for suit.”) (quoting Pharrell
Williams).
18. Adam Pasick, A Copyright Victory for Marvin Gaye’s Family is Terrible for the
Future of Music, QUARTZ (Mar. 10, 2015), http://qz.com/360126/a-copyright-victory-formarvin-gayes-family-is-terrible-for-the-future-of-music/ [https://perma.cc/CFK9-F68V].
When we say a song ‘sounds like’ a certain era, it’s because artists in that era were
doing a lot of the same things—or, yes, copying each other. If copyright were to
extend out past things like the melody to really cover the other parts that make up the
‘feel’ of a song, there’s no way an era, or a city, or a movement could have a certain
sound. Without that, we lose the next disco, the next Motown, the next batch of
protest songs.
Id. (quoting Parker Higgins, director of copyright activism at the Electronic Frontier
Foundation)
19. Tim Kenneally & Pamela Chelin, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Williams Appeal ‘Blurred
Lines’ Copyright Infringement Lawsuit, THE WRAP (Dec. 8, 2015, 12:59 P.M.),
http://www.thewrap.com/robin-thicke-pharrell-williams-appeal-blurred-lines-copyrightinfringement-lawsuit/.
20. It is important to note that the amici curiae brief was not commissioned or paid for
by Williams, Thicke, or anyone on their legal team, but rather was the offspring of the two
hundred twelve musicians’ collective concerns that this verdict threatens the future of creativity,
music production, and the music industry as a whole. Randy Lewis, More Than 200 Musicians
Rally Behind Appeal of ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:45 A.M.),
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concern regarding the negative impact the verdict could have “on their
own creativity, on the creativity of future artists, and on the music industry
in general.”21 It further threatened that if the judgment is allowed to stand,
it could “punish songwriters for creating new music that is inspired by
prior works.”22 It concludes by pleading to the Ninth Circuit to overturn
the verdict because if becomes the standard, it “would clearly stifle future
creativity, would undoubtedly diminish the legacies of past songwriters,
and, without a doubt, would be antithetical to the principals of the
Copyright Act.”23
Not all copying is actionable under copyright law.24 However, as the
“Blurred Lines” case demonstrates, the infringement analysis utilized
today does not always adequately account for the core characteristics of
music, and thus has the potential to produce inaccurate findings of
copyright infringement and meritless liability for musicians.
This Note describes the inefficiencies of the copyright system’s test
for infringement based on the continued use of the Ordinary Observer
Analysis as a measure for subjective copying. It argues that the Intended
Audience Test should be applied in all copyright infringement cases
involving musical works as a better subjective measure for illicit copying.
To set the groundwork for this thesis, Part I details the background
of copyright law, beginning with its origins in the United States
Constitution. Part I also discusses Congress’s numerous attempts to create
a functioning statutory scheme that best promotes the two aims of
copyright law—protecting the creative expression of artists, and
benefitting society through a multitude of creative works in the public
domain. Finally, Part I will provide a background of specific
characteristics of music production and consumption that are changing the
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/la-et-ms-blurred-lines-appeal-musicians20160831-snap-story html.
21. Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers in
Support of Appellants at 2, Williams v. Gaye, 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-56880 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015). Notable artists who signed onto the brief
include Hans Zimmer, Phillip Bailey, Verdine White, and Ralph Johnson of Earth, Wind & Fire,
Rich Robinson of The Black Crowes, John Oates of Hall & Oates, R. Kelly, Jennifer Hudson,
Patrick Monahan of Train, Jean Baptiste, Rivers Cuomo of Weezer, and Mat Kearney. Id. at i–
iv.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 17. An additional amici curiae brief was filed by musicologists detailing their
fears that if the verdict stands, “it would curtail creativity in the field of popular music, inhibiting
songwriters by the threat of far-fetched claims of infringement bolstered by speculative and
misleading musical testimony.” Amicus Curiae Brief of Musicologists in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants-Cross-Appellees at 1, Williams v. Gaye, 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. 2015),
appeal docketed, No. 15-56880 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015).
24. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
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way to evaluate these works under copyright law.
Part II explains the current analysis for copyright infringement using
hypothetical parties—Band X and Band Y. It details Band X’s
infringement claim against Band Y, and the steps Band X must go through
under the current system. Part II also discusses the various tests for
substantial similarity as used within the federal circuit courts of appeal.
The role of the Intended Audience Test within the analysis for
substantial similarity is discussed in Part III. Additionally, Part III
describes the origins of the Intended Audience Test, its current
applications, and a recent case declining to apply the test to a music
infringement suit.
Finally, Part IV details a three-prong argument as to why the
Intended Audience Test will provide a more modern and effective
subjective analysis for copyright infringement actions. First, normalcies
in music production are not accounted for in today’s infringement
analysis, which creates the possibility of inaccurate infringement
decisions. Next, music consumption has shifted due to a new digital
landscape, causing the “ordinary observer” to be an inadequate subjective
measure for illicit copying. Finally, more accurate infringement analyses
resulting from implementation of the Intended Audience Test will better
promote the main purpose of copyright law—to benefit the public domain.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins and Purpose of Copyright Law
1. The Constitution and the Copyright Act Throughout Time
The United States Copyright Office defines copyright law as “that
body of exclusive rights granted by law to authors for protection of their
work.”25 This protection is a “principle of American law” and allows “an
author of a work [to] reap the fruits of his or her intellectual creativity for
a limited period of time.”26 The author’s exclusive rights over the
protected work are meant to incentivize and promote creativity through a
national copyright system.27
Congress’s copyright power stems from the Constitution: “[t]he
Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”28 This

25.
A Brief Introduction and History, U.
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ1a html [perma.cc/5XG5-XL5W].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

S.

COPYRIGHT

OFFICE,
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confers onto Congress the ability to enact a body of copyright law to
protect the works of creators in order to promote the public welfare.29
The Copyright Act of 1790 was Congress’s first exercise of this
explicit power, after conflicting state copyright laws made the need for a
national system overly evident.30 Congress modeled the Act after
Parliament’s Statute of Anne,31 the British copyright law passed in 1710
that granted authors full control over their works.32 However, as
technology developed through the nineteenth century, the introduction of
new types of works necessitated the expansion of further protections under
the 1790 Act.33
In 1909, a more substantial change adapted the 1790 Act to the everincreasing technological advances of the time.34 The 1790 Act was
overhauled to significantly increase the scope of protection for copyright
holders due to the new mechanisms for creating and distributing works of
authorship—sound recordings35 being one of the most prominent.36
However, when the 1909 Act became inefficient due to further
technological advances, there was again interest to reform the Copyright
Act in the mid-twentieth century.37 This time the process took over two
decades—beginning with the Copyright Office’s report in 1955, and
ending with the reformed Act taking effect in 1976.38
Currently, The Copyright Act of 1976 is the basis of American
copyright law.39 Under Section 102, copyright protection applies to
29.
30.

See A Brief Introduction and History, supra note 25.
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 386 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007).
31. The Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19.
32. Katie M. Benton, Can Copyright Law Perform the Perfect Fouetté?: Keeping Law
and Choreography on Balance to Achieve the Purposes of the Copyright Clause, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 59, 64 (2008).
33. MERGES ET AL., supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. It was not until 1972 that “sound recordings” of musical compositions were
considered to be “works of authorship,” which required protection under the copyright clause.
Ryan Lloyd, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the Changing Music Landscape, 22 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 143, 148 (2014).
36. MERGES ET AL., supra note 30.
37. Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, 1976: Revision of
the U.S. Copyright Act, ASS’N OF RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyrightip/2486-copyright-timeline#.Vo2JdPGEKQF [https://perma.cc/8U8M-7VPA].
38. MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 387.
39. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat. 2541);
see MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 387 (“After two decades of study, negotiation, and debate,
Congress approved the 1976 Act, which continues to serve as the principle framework for
copyright protection in the United States.”).
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“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.”40 The scope of protection extends to a variety of literary and
artistic works because the 1976 reformation needed to account for
technological developments at the time and their impact on copyright
law.41
The revision also better addressed what constituted an
infringement—laying out the idea-expression dichotomy to clearly define
what is and is not protected under the Act.42
2. The Rights of Copyright Holders
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright holders exclusive
rights to their protected work for a limited time.43 This includes the right
to make copies and bring suit for infringement; the right to prepare
derivative works that are in different forms or slightly altered; the right to
control the sale and distribution of the original or derivative works; the
right to control the public performance and display of the work; the right
of anti-circumvention; and the moral rights to claim authorship over the
work.44 The copyright holder does not have to obtain a registered
copyright before exercising these exclusive rights because his expression
is protected at the moment of creation.45
The rights described in Section 106 are not meant to limit secondary
use of protected material in the public domain, but rather to prevent
unlawful infringement of the holder’s protected expression.46 Copyright
law does not prevent independent creation of similar works, and thus a
mechanism for determining illicit copying in violation of the copyright
versus lawful secondary creation is necessary.47
3. Competing Public Policy—Balancing the Purposes of Copyright

40. Despite specifying the protected works must be “tangible,” implying there must be a
physical component to the work, the Copyright Act also protects forms of authorship normally
considered “intangible,” such as sound recordings and audiovisual works. 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2015).
41. Copyright Timeline, supra note 37.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”); see also Sid & Marty Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977) (highlighting the criticism often associated with this
idea-expression analysis, but noting that no other viable option exists to balance the two
competing interests of copyright law—protecting the artist and permitting society to benefit and
progress from the use of the work).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2015).
44. MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 388–89.
45. Id. at 388.
46. Id. at 389.
47. Id.
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Law
Copyright law’s “philosophical foundations” are often debated,
creating uncertainty as to the true purpose of copyright law.48 The “natural
right” of authors to control the use of their works has been a predominate
factor in determining the scope of copyright protection.49 However, there
is a utilitarian function of copyright law that competes against the
monopoly interest of copyright holders—the necessity to enrich the public
domain50 with creative, artistic, and literary works.51
Copyright law must balance these two competing interests to best
promote the “harvest of knowledge” for society as a whole.52 There are
numerous societal benefits that stem from a constant production of
creative works in the public domain.53 This includes the vast influx of
new knowledge for follow-up creators to use and build upon, the
educational value of creative material on society’s knowledge and culture,
and consumptive and economic uses of artistic works to increase the
cultural landscape.54
With these societal benefits in mind, note that the “exclusive rights”
associated with copyright protection have been known to create a quasimonopoly for artists over their protected work.55 The exaggerated length
and scope of copyright protection can actually work to hinder the benefit
to the public domain.56 Despite arguments that the monopoly privileges

48. Id. at 390.
49. Id.
50. Séverine Dusollier, Scoping Study on Copyright and Related Rights and the Public
Domain,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.
6
(May
7,
2010),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3_rev_study_inf_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RVS4-FTG8] (“The public domain is generally defined as encompassing
intellectual elements that are not protected by copyright or whose protection has lapsed, due to
the expiration of the duration for protection.”).
51. MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 390–91.
52. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1107 (1990).
53. Dusollier, supra note 50, at 13.
54. Id. at 14.
55. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (“The
monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the
public.”); see also Leval, supra note 52, at 1109.
The copyright law embodies a recognition that creative intellectual activity is vital to
the well-being of society. It is a pragmatic measure by which society confers
monopoly-exploitation benefits for a limited duration on authors and artists . . . in
order to obtain for itself the intellectual and practical enrichment that results from
creative endeavors.
Id.
56. William Patry, Time to Update Copyright Law?, CNN (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:30 PM),
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of copyright holders are counter-balanced against “numerous and
substantial exceptions and limitations to protection,” the copyright system
is primarily a mechanism for fostering creativity and enriching the public
with a multitude of artistic expression.57 The scope of protection for
holders must be restricted by exceptions and limitations in order to
promote that purpose.58
This monopolistic system was never the intention, nor the purpose,
of copyright law.59 The privileges granted from copyright protection are
not meant to be all-encompassing or overly restrictive on secondary users,
but rather are to “motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors
by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.”60 However, Congress is tasked with defining the scope of
protection for copyright holders, while also aiming to promote a multitude
of artistic expression for the public, and thus, striking the perfect balance
has not been easy.61
Evidence exists that copyright protection was always intended to be
limited—beginning with the origins of copyright law.62 The time
restriction noted in the text of the Constitution confirms that the protection

http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/31/opinion/patry-copyright-law/ [https://perma.cc/FBP2-KNZX]
(arguing the 1909 Act had a more sensible term of protection—28 years with the possibility of
an additional 28 years if the copyright holder filed a renewal—so that artists were still very
much protected, but consumers were better able to benefit from the works).
57. MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 388; Karen Bevill, Copyright Infringement and
Access: Has the Access Requirement Lost its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 313
(1999) (“As a society, we value the arts and wish to foster creativity through the granting and
enforcement of copyrights”).
58. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429 (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.”).
59. H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music
has been to give the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition,
and it has been a serious and a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer
with the protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would accomplish the
double purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all use made of his
composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies,
which might be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the purpose
of protecting his interests.
Id.
60. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429.
61. Id. (suggesting Congress’s difficult task of balancing the two competing interest is
one reason why the Copyright Act has been amended previously).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Congress can grant to copyright holders is not absolute.63 In drafting the
copyright clause, the Framers of the Constitution “balance[d] the
competing interests of incentivizing creation and ensuring freedom to
information by limiting the term of copyright.”64 It was the intention of
the Framers to make this protection penetrable for the good of the public.65
Legislators attempted to further limit copyright holders’ exclusive
rights to their protected work to better balance the two competing
interests.66 In addition to the limited time of copyright protection, which
is the life of the artist plus seventy years,67 copyright law limits owners’
protection through means such as the fair use, first sale, merger doctrines,
and compulsory licensing.68 These modifications to copyright law shift
the monopoly of artists, and demonstrate Congress’s attempts to promote
the goal of enriching the public domain with creative works.69
Regardless of the two competing interests at stake—the artists’
protection versus enrichment of the public domain—copyright
jurisprudence indicates protection for the artists is always secondary.70
The protection that copyright law grants is not meant to be an
impenetrable shield for the creator, but rather a mechanism of
incentivizing the production of creative works in order to “stimulate
activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the
public.”71 This is what copyright law was intended to do—this is its

63. Id. (referring to the copyright protection as extending only “for limited times”); see
also Leval, supra note 52, at 1108 (“[T]he right may be conferred only ‘for limited times’
confirms that it was not seen as an absolute or moral right, inherent in natural law”).
64. Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149.
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The utility of this power will scarcely
be questioned . . . . The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals.”).
66. Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2015) (applying only to works created on or after January 1, 1978).
68. Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (2015).
69. Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149; see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 387 (“[T]he
1976 Act weakened intellectual property protection by establishing several new compulsory
licensing regimes, approving numerous exceptions from liability, codifying the fair use doctrine
that had been developing through the courts, and preempting most state and common law
protections that impinge upon federal copyright protection.”).
70. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright
law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly [to copyright holders] lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors.”).
71. Leval, supra note 52 (“The copyright is not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that
confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations.”).
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primary goal.72
B. Music and the Law
The interaction of music and law is uniquely distinct to copyright
litigation—“[w]hile the first is commonly regarded as a rule-free zone, the
second is in itself the origin for rules.”73 Historically, courts have applied
copyright law to music just like any other work of authorship.74 With the
introduction of music copyright law in the early 1800s, courts included it
with other works of authorship because the role of music in everyday life
at that time was much less complex and required less differentiation.75
However, as music developed and started to hold a “prominent stature in
society,” music copyright law remained comparatively stagnant.76
Music has a deep effect on individuals, “speak[ing] to us in
mysterious and profound ways and invok[ing] within us numerous
physiological and emotional responses.”77 When listening to music,
nearly every region of the brain is actively working, making it a highly
technical neurological process.78 It takes multiple neural regions to break
down and comprehend the various musical elements of a song, such as
tempo, pitch, and timbre.79 Even deeper, because of its communicative
power, the emotional responses evoked from music make it distinctive
from other forms of artistic expression.80
Although there is limited understanding as to why humans are
affected so deeply by music, there is no doubt it is crucial to human nature
and the way we lead our daily lives.81 Conforming music to fit in the
narrowly tailored box that is copyright law does not adequately measure

72. See Arden v. Columbia Pictures, Indus., 908 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stating that the main goal of fostering creativity is a core consideration in determinations
regarding substantial similarity); see also Pendleton v. Acuff-Rose Publ’ns, Inc., 605 F. Supp.
477, 484 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (arguing that fostering creativity and allowing the public to benefit
from creative works is a fundamental objective of copyright law).
73. Iyar Stav, Musical Plagiarism: A True Challenge for the Copyright Law, 25 DEPAUL
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2014).
74. J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 410 (2004).
75. Id. at 419.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 421.
78. DANIEL J. LEVITIN, THIS IS YOUR BRAIN ON MUSIC: THE SCIENCE OF A HUMAN
OBSESSION 84 (Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2007).
79. Id.
80. Keyes, supra note 74, at 422–23 (“It inspires, consoles, motivates, awakens, and
energizes us unlike other artistic endeavors. It can make us weep or give us intense pleasure.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
81. Id. at 423.
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how music is perceived and comprehended by society, nor does it promote
copyright law’s broader policy goals.82 The law needs to be “tailored to
provide greater flexibility in the manner in which people are allowed to
respond to music that they perceive.”83 Therefore, necessary changes to
music copyright law are crucial to differentiate it from other forms of
authorship.84
C. Characteristics of Music Production
Elements of music production distinguish it from all other forms of
authorship.85 For example, borrowing and copying music between artists
is a common practice—“[f]or the most part, taking someone else’s
musical idea and developing it in a new way is largely understood as part
of musical culture and thus entirely consistent with cultural norms.”86
From the days of classical composers studying similar concepts, to the
new era of sampling and digital manipulation that transforms past musical
creations, copying has always been at the root of music production.87
Even the two hundred twelve songwriters, composers, producers, and
musicians who backed the amici curiae brief in favor of overturning the
“Blurred Lines” verdict, recognize that “[a]ll music shares inspiration
from prior musical works, especially within a particular musical genre.”88
This endorsement by the industry’s top talent supports the conclusion that
borrowing and copying as a part of music production, is not only
theoretically accurate, but the practical applications of these
characteristics are also widely recognized and utilized within the music
industry.89
The artists’ collective sentiment in their brief to the Ninth Circuit is
that “[v]irtually no music can be said to be 100% new and original.”90 As
evidence to support this notion, the brief cites a string of famous musical
inspirations, noting how each inspiration shaped the production of
legendary music that came after it—specifically, it notes how Elton John
was influenced by The Beatles, who were influenced by Elvis Presley,
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Carys Craig & Guillaume Laroche, Out of Tune: Why Copyright Law Needs
Music Lessons, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACHES 43, 47 (B.C. Doagoo et al. eds., 2014).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 48.
88. Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers, supra
note 21.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 9.
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who was inspired by pop, country, gospel, and R&B music he listened to
as a teenager growing up in Memphis.91 The brief goes on to question
whether music legends, including Marvin Gaye, would have been able to
cultivate such powerful and memorable music if they had been afraid to
draw inspiration from past idols.92
For music creation to continue to expand and prosper, adaptation of
past musical works through copying and borrowing is necessary.93 This
is because there are only a limited number of musical note combinations
that are pleasing to the Western listener, making the possible combination
of notes for new musical works highly limited.94 Characteristics of a
particular genre will also control compositional choices and dictate
tonalities of musical works.95
Judge Learned Hand even recognized these limitations in 1940 by
writing: “It must be remembered that while there are an enormous number
of possible permutations of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are
pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular
ear. Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism.”96
These constraints greatly impact music production and limit the range of
expression available to musicians—making the artist’s ability to produce
music free from any past expression close to impossible.97 Rather than
viewing adaptation of past musical works as illicit copying, artists
recognize that their works will be used as building blocks for future
creators to produce their own music—a fact currently ignored by
copyright law.98

91. Id.
92. Id. at 9–10 (“Quite simply, if an artist is not allowed to display his or her musical
influences, for fear of legal reprisal, there is very little new music that is going to be created,
particularly with the limitations that already naturally exist in songwriting.”).
93. Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 48.
94.
Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music:
Determining Whether What Sounds Alike Is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 262
(2013).
95. Id.
96. Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d. Cir. 1940)
97. Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 263.
98. Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers, supra
note 21, at 13.
All musical works, indeed all creative works, are born from a spark of inspiration. It
is essential for musicians and composers to be able to find this spark anywhere and
everywhere without having to constantly look over their shoulders and worry about
being sued. To extinguish this spark, to replace it with fear, is to stifle creativity and
deprive society of the next generation of great artists and new music. And yes, artists
should be able to talk freely about their sources of inspiration without having to worry
about their exuberant proclamations being played back as damning evidence in a court
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D.

Music Consumption Over Time
Music continues to be a constant pulse in society.99 However, the
way individuals consume music is changing dramatically.100 The increase
in streaming technology created a shift from traditional mediums, like
radio and hard-copy CDs, to a more online-driven music experience.101
Currently, an astounding seventy-five percent of the U.S. population
listens to music online.102
On-demand and curated streaming services, such as Pandora,
Spotify, and YouTube, are now an integral part of how the everyday
American obtains and consumes music.103 A Nielsen104 study of media
consumption during 2014 showed a fifty-four percent increase in ondemand streaming, and over 164 billion songs streamed through audio and
video platforms.105 Another Nielsen study showed a total of over 135
billion songs streamed in the first half of 2015 alone—indicating this trend
is growing, and fast.106
Music consumption is not only shifting to a primarily online format,
it is also going mobile—the study reported forty-four percent of
participants use smartphones to listen to music each week rather than
home computers.107 Expenditures on music have also largely shifted to
online streaming services because of the relatively low cost of obtaining

of law.
Id. at 15 (quoting Ron Mendelsohn, owner of production company Megatrax).
99.
Nielsen Music 360 Report: 2015 Highlights, NIELSEN 6 (2015),
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2015-reports/music360-2015-highlights-sept-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADW3-547N].
100. See id.
101. See Armen Boyajian, The Sound of Money: Securing Copyright, Royalties, and
Creative “Progress” in the Digital Music Revolution, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 589 (2010)
(“Compared to the costly production and distribution methods that characterized the age of
tangible media (e.g., LPs, analog tapes, CDs, and DVDs), the advent of digitally compressed
audio formats and online networks has opened superior channels for the proliferation of
music.”).
102. Nielsen Music 360 Report: 2015 Highlights, supra note 99.
103. See Jacob Ganz, How Streaming Is Changing Music, NPR MUSIC (June 1, 2015,
10:20 AM), http://www npr.org/sections/therecord/2015/06/01/411119372/how-streaming-ischanging-music [https://perma.cc/4J4N-2TQX].
104.
About Us, NIELSEN, http://www nielsen.com/us/en/about-us html [https://
perma.cc/P98N-59MB] (providing in-depth studies of media consumption throughout the world
to help businesses get a complete view of trends and habits of consumers).
105.
2014 Nielsen Music Report, NIELSEN (Jan. 7, 2015), http://
www nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2015/2014-nielsen-music-report html
[https://perma.cc/KE4Q-8EST].
106. Nielsen Music 360 Report: 2015 Highlights, supra note 99, at 3.
107. Id.
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these services, their user-friendly nature, and the expansive song library
available.108
Although this emerging digital marketplace allows a broader
spectrum of music to reach consumers, the increased usage of on-demand
and curated streaming services, at home or on the go, has shifted daily
music consumption to a more personalized format.109 This is due to the
design of on-demand streaming platforms, which is geared towards
promoting individualized consumption of music.110
For example, to create the most personalized listening experience,
Spotify utilizes music intelligence that generates “the right listening
experience at the right time.”111 This is done through a comprehensive
system of analyzing the makeup of songs, discovering what is being said
about music online, and researching how people are listening to it.112
After tracking each user’s listening habits, individual “taste profiles” are
created to produce the most individualized listening experience.113 The
taste profiles break down into “taste clusters” that often highlight the
user’s favorite genre of music versus what they are listening to as
background music while focused on something else.114 Taste clusters
allow Spotify to promote the most accurate scope of songs, artists, and
playlists to fit the unique taste of the listener.115 Spotify also offers its
“Discover Weekly” playlist, based off each user’s taste profile, to
highlight new music in the specific genre in which the user is interested.116
108. Id. at 5–6.
109. See Marc Hogan, How Playlists Are Curating the Future of Music, PITCHFORK (July
16, 2015), http://pitchfork.com/features/articles/9686-up-next-how-playlists-are-curating-thefuture-of-music/ [https://perma.cc/K9T6-AHHE] (detailing the lengths on-demand streaming
services are going through to differentiate themselves by helping users customize their playlists
and other listening patterns).
110. Alex Heath, Spotify is Getting Unbelievably Good at Picking Music—Here’s an
Inside Look at How, TECH INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2015, 9:23 AM), http://www.techinsider.io/insidespotify-and-the-future-of-music-streaming [https://perma.cc/8QPA-QNLR] (claiming that it is
Spotify’s mission to make the most personalized music listening service ever); see also John
Seabrook, Revenue Streams: Is Spotify the Music Industry’s Friend or its Foe?, NEW YORKER
(Nov.
24,
2014),
http://www newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/revenue-streams
[https://perma.cc/9YGH-FUN4].
111. Heath, supra note 110 (quoting Jim Lucchese, CEO of The Echo Nest, Spotify’s
music intelligence company).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (describing the background music as the user’s “lean back” listening
experience).
115. Id.
116. Id. (“[Matt] Ogle gives a simple analogy for how Discover Weekly works: You’ve
been playing song A and song C a lot, but it turns out that when other people play those songs
together in their playlists there’s a song B that you’ve never heard before. Discover Weekly
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Through the use of the customized playlists, these on-demand streaming
platforms provide music suggestions to users in the exact style they enjoy
without having to search for it.117
Streaming services grow in popularity daily, and consumers shift to
sites like Spotify in record numbers because of their customizable
services.118 The unique features of streaming services, specifically the
ability to customize the listening experience, make them a great fit in
today’s musical landscape.119 Instead of forcing listeners to sort through
every music genre, streaming services allow today’s listener to
personalize their music choices.120
II. THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS & THE VARIOUS
MEASURES OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
When a party feels his copyrighted work has been copied, he can file
an infringement claim against the alleged infringer in federal court.121
However, a copyright infringement claim is deceivingly complex, as it
involves many steps for a claimant to succeed once at trial.122 To ensure
the most accurate depiction of how an infringement suit operates under
current copyright law, this section of the Note presents hypothetical
parties to an infringement claim—Band X wants to bring a claim against
Band Y for infringing on their copyrighted work under Section 501 of the

gives you song B.”).
117. Id. (“I see Discover Weekly as one of the first products from this new era of
personalization, but ultimately we’d love for everything you interact with on Spotify to feel like
there’s a bit of you in it.”) (quoting Matt Ogle, Spotify employee in charge of Discover Weekly
playlist).
118. Spotify has doubled its paid subscribers to 20 million in the last year, and has an
additional 55 million free users accessing its music library of over 35 million songs. Id.
119. Jareen Imam, Young Listeners Opting to Stream, Not Own Music, CNN (June 16,
2012,
3:39
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/tech/web/music-streaming/
[https://perma.cc/67HX-TYWL].
120. Id.
121. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2015).
122. Jason E. Sloan, An Overview of the Elements of Copyright Infringement Cause of
Action – Part I: Introduction and Copying, A.B.A. YOUNG LAWS. DIV.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_serie
s/elements_of_a_copyright html [https://perma.cc/N4CC-3D38].
[The infringement analysis] does not lend itself to helpful generalizations because the
test for infringement is necessarily vague. This allows for the test to be applied to
various types of works and contexts regardless of the nature of the copying. To further
complicate copyright infringement actions, different courts have applied the elements
of infringement in somewhat conflicting ways, resulting in the creation of exceptions
and carve-outs based on the particular facts at hand.
Id.
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Copyright Act.123 To do this, Band X must first establish a valid copyright
on its work, and then prove that Band Y unlawfully copied protectable
elements of that work.124
A registered copyright, granted under Section 410 of the Copyright
Act, provides prima facie proof of a valid copyright.125 If Band X has a
copyright certificate, Band Y may rebut its validity by taking on the
burden of proving the falsity of an improperly granted certificate.126
Once a valid copyright has been established, the burden shifts to
Band X, the copyright holder, to prove copying of protectable material.127
At this stage in the analysis, simply identifying commonalities between
the two works is not sufficient proof.128 Therefore, to effectively prove
infringement of copyrighted material, Band X must prove: (1) actual
copying, and (2) that a substantial amount of copying occurred, which
warrants a finding of unlawful appropriation of its protectable
expression.129
A. Step One: Actual Copying
Actual copying is often difficult to prove because obtaining direct
evidence of copying—through Band Y’s own admission, witness
testimony, or a record of Band Y’s physical copying—is rare.130
Therefore, most infringement actions instead utilize the inference of actual
copying.131 To prove actual copying through inference, Band X must
prove Band Y had access to the work and that probative similarity exists
between the works.132
1. Access
The element of access requires Band X to prove the reasonable
possibility that the accused work was available to Band Y, the alleged
infringer.133 Reasonable possibility of access may be proven from

123. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2015) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author.”).
124. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2015).
126. Bevill, supra note 57, at 316.
127. Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1331 (2012).
128. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
129. Id.
130.
Timothy L. Warnock, “Access” and “Striking Similarity” in Copyright
Infringement Litigation, 3 LANDSLIDE 18, 18 (2010).
131. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 2015).
132. Id.
133. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988).
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widespread dissemination of Band X’s work134 or from a proven link
between Band X’s work and Band Y.135 However, if the two works are so
“strikingly similar” that it makes Band Y’s independent creation is
unreasonable, then access may be inferred.136
2. Probative Similarity
In determining the probative similarity137 between Band X’s
copyrighted work and Band Y’s alleged copy, courts consider unoriginal
or non-protectable elements of the work.138 At this stage, the court
assesses whether there are enough elements of copying to go forward with
the infringement claim.139 This inquiry is necessary to prove that factual
copying occurred, and to negate claims that Band Y independently created
the alleged infringing work, free from the use of Band X’s protected
expression.140
Band Y may rebut any of the circumstantial evidence associated with
actual copying.141 Band Y can provide evidence that its work was, in fact,
independently created, or evidence that shows that there is no reasonable
possibility of access to Band X’s work to negate claims of actual
copying.142
B. Step Two: Unlawful Appropriation
As actual copying can be insufficient to prevail on an actionable
infringement claim, Band X must next establish unlawful appropriation to
succeed in an infringement action.143 The test for unlawful appropriation
requires Band X to prove that Band Y’s infringing work is substantially

134. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983);
see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02[A] (explaining that a
copyrighted work becomes widely disseminated by extensive publication or through modern
technology, such as the Internet, which can make almost any work accessible to the larger
public).
135. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1944).
136. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984).
137. In copyright literature, probative similarity is often referred to as “substantial
similarity” by courts in proving actual copying. Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” As Proof
of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1187, 1189–90 (1990). However, “substantial similarity” is relevant in proving unlawful
appropriation of Band X’s copyrightable expression, after actual copying has been inferred. Id.
138. Sloan, supra note 122.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984).
143. DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (N.D. Tex.
1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
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similar to their protected material.144 At this stage, the determination
regarding “substantial similarity” is made.145
Copyright protection only extends to the artist’s expression, not facts
or ideas, and this separation plays a large role in the ultimate determination
of substantial similarity.146 This idea-expression dichotomy acts as the
dividing line between protected material under copyright law and
unprotected material that should remain in the public domain for future
use.147 The distinction between protectable and non-protectable material
speaks to the balancing of the two policy considerations of copyright
law—protecting the creators and benefitting the public.148 The ideaexpression dichotomy shapes the court’s ultimate determination of
substantial similarity.149 In this process, courts aim to find substantial
similarity between the works only in their expression—if they share mere
ideas, there is no infringement.150
The courts currently utilize a variety of tests to measure whether
there is substantial similarity in copyright infringement cases.151 The
application of these tests, and the language used to describe the process,
is quite complicated, as courts often attempt to re-work the tests to clarify
misunderstandings.152 However, these alterations often lead to more
uncertainty as to what it actually means for works to be “substantially
similar,” and leave no foundation for any standardized test.153 This is one
reason there is currently a split in the circuit courts regarding the proper

144. Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
145. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 898 F. Supp. at 1188 (“Not all copying is copyright
infringement. The second question that must be analyzed is whether the copying at issue is
legally actionable. This question involves a comparative analysis of the two works at issue to
determine whether they are substantially similar.”).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015).
147. Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1381 (2007).
148. See supra Section I.A.3.
149. Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1382.
150. There are issues regarding the accuracy of the court’s evaluation between what
constitutes expression versus an idea. Id. There is currently no bright line rule to make this
determination, and courts are often left to their own devices in making these conclusions. Id.
However, this issue is not within the scope of this Note, and will not be addressed outside of
acknowledging that the court must make this distinction in determining substantial similarity.
151. See discussion infra Sections II.B.1–3.
152. Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1382.
153. Ambiguity in the realm of substantial similarity tests results in unpredictable results
and ad hoc judicial decision-making. Id. This raises the question of whether the Supreme Court
should formulate one single test, or if there should even be a test at all. Id. However, arguments
regarding whether the existence of a test in is the best interest of the copyright system is outside
the scope of this Note.
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way to test for substantial similarity.154
The following sections briefly discuss the different tests used in the
circuit courts as a means for analyzing substantial similarity. The majority
of circuits follow the traditional Ordinary Observer Analysis,155 others
utilize the Extrinsic/Intrinsic Analysis,156 and some follow a version of the
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Analysis.157 Although the specifics of
the tests vary, there is a constant in each—the subjective determination for
unlawful appropriation.158 The Intended Audience Test should replace the
subjective determination for unlawful appropriation in all current
infringement analyses involving musical works.
1. The Ordinary Observer Analysis
The landmark case Arnstein v. Porter developed the framework for
copyright infringement.159 Although criticized as highly plaintifffriendly160 and oftentimes overbroad in its subjective analysis,161 the
structure set up in Arnstein remains the basis for all substantial similarity
tests applied today.162
In the Arnstein decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals created
a two-step infringement test requiring: (1) evidence of access and
probative similarity, and (2) a finding of illicit copying amounting to
unlawful appropriation.163 The second step in the analysis uses the

154. Id.
155. Peel & Co., Inc. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001); Dawson v. Hinshaw
Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,
Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp.,
672 F.2d 607, 614–15 (7th Cir. 1982); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904,
907 (3d Cir. 1975); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
156. Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
157. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855 (6th Cir. 2003); Sturdza v. United Arab
Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993).
158. Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996)
(detailing the subjective component of the abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164 (detailing the subjective component of
the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (detailing
the subjective component of the “ordinary observer” analysis).
159. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 464.
160. Cronin, supra note 5, at 1193.
161. See Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1390–91.
162. Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for
Copyright Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-LAC J. ART & ENT. L. 43, 46 (1995).
163. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
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perspective of the “ordinary lay hearer.”164 The assumption that the
“ordinary observer” is the proper subjective measure stems from the
Court’s finding that copyright law is meant to protect the artist from lost
financial returns resulting from infringing work.165 The Court reasoned
since the “ordinary observer” is part of the audience that interacts with the
work in the marketplace, it is he who should determine whether the
copying amounts to unlawful appropriation, and thus infringement
liability.166
Despite its longevity and prominence in copyright history, many
critics have highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Arnstein analysis.167
Even the dissenting opinion gravely critiqued the majority’s finding that
the “ordinary observer” is the best measure of subjective similarity.168
These criticisms, as well as judicial decisions deviating from the original
Arnstein procedure, exemplify the downfalls of the Ordinary Observer
Analysis.
2. The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Analysis
One of the first recognized variations of the Arnstein decision was
the development of the Extrinsic/Intrinsic Analysis in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corporation.169 In this case,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reformulated the two-part test
established in Arnstein based on the idea-expression dichotomy of
copyright law.170 The extrinsic prong is an objective determination for

164. Id. To constitute unlawful appropriation, the Court must determine “whether
defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of the lay listeners,
who compromise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.” Id. at 473.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the
Intended Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 397 (1992) (“The
result [of the ordinary observer analysis] is a finding of infringement where perhaps none exists,
chilling the creation of new musical works. Or, equally as unfortunate, a finding of no
infringement where unlawful copying has actually occurred.”).
168. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 475–76 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Of course, sound is important in a case of this kind, but it is not so important as to
falsify what the eye reports and the mind teaches. Otherwise plagiarism would be
suggested by the mere drumming of repetitious sound from our usual popular
music . . . particularly when ears may be dulled by long usage, possibly artistic
repugnance or boredom, or mere distance which causes all sounds to merge.
Id.
169. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
170. Id. at 1164.
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probative similarity171 between the works’ “criteria which can be listed
and analyzed.”172 This process allows the use of expert testimony and
analytic dissection173 to aid the trier of fact.174 The intrinsic prong utilizes
the “ordinary observer” standard from Arnstein to make a subjective
evaluation regarding unlawful appropriation.175 There is a finding of
intrinsic similarity if “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same.”176 At this stage, expert testimony and analytic
dissection is not considered.177
As with the Ordinary Observer Analysis, this test is criticized as
well.178 Inclusion of expert testimony and analytic dissection in the
extrinsic prong, but exclusion during the intrinsic prong, presents
challenges for the fact finder, who might be the decision-maker during the
entire infringement analysis.179 Shifting from the extrinsic prong to the
intrinsic prong, but asking the fact finder to ignore the information utilized
in making an extrinsic determination, is close to impossible.180 This raises
doubts as to accuracy of the test’s subjective determination, and due to
these inefficiencies, the test does not apply easily to complex, technical
subject matter, such as in music cases.181
3. The Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Analysis
A minority of courts apply the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison

171. The Krofft opinion described the extrinsic analysis as a determination of “substantial
similarity in ideas” because of its foundation in the idea-expression dichotomy. Id. However,
this language is misleading and confusing, since a finding of probative similarity does not only
focus on non-protectable material (ideas), but rather on similarities in the entirety of the work.
Broaddus, supra note 162, at 51 nn.44–47. Later decisions in the Ninth Circuit have modified
the Krofft analysis to avoid these problems. Id.
172. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164.
173. Analytic dissection “involves breaking works down into their constituent elements
and comparing those elements to determine whether the similarities that exist are in the
unprotectable elements (for example ideas or scenes a faire).” Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at
1399.
174. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164.
175. Id. (“The two works involved in this appeal should be considered and tested, not
hypercritically or with meticulous scrutiny, but by the observations and impressions of the
average reasonable reader and spectator.”) (quoting Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944)).
176. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d. Cir. 1960).
177. Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 261.
178. Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 269
(2014).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1402.
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Analysis for substantial similarity.182 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
outlined the three-step test as follows:
At the abstraction step, we separate the ideas (and basic utilitarian
functions), which are not protectable, from the particular expression
of the work. Then, we filter out of the nonprotectable components of
the product from the original expression. Finally, we compare the
remaining protected elements to the allegedly copied work to
determine if the two works are substantially similar. 183

The “ordinary observer” methodology is applied during the
comparison step of this process, but considers only protectable elements
of the copyrighted work, rather than the works in their entirety.184 Since
the goal of the analysis is to filter out the protectable expression from the
non-protectable ideas, this test is also criticized as being vague and
difficult to apply, as there has been no clear direction or procedure on how
the filtration occurs.185
III. THE INTENDED AUDIENCE TEST: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS THAT DEVIATE
FROM THE “ORDINARY OBSERVER”
A constant throughout the numerous tests for substantial similarity is
the subjective component—would the “ordinary, lay listener” find illicit
copying.186 In situations where the works at issue are more technical and
require greater skill, a minority of courts adopted a variation from the
default “ordinary” recipient of the copyrighted material.187 This is the
Intended Audience Test.
A. A Change to Arnstein
One of the first alterations to Arnstein’s Ordinary Observer Analysis
was in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.188 In
this case, competing computer programs involved subject matter so
complicated (for its time) that an ordinary lay jury or judge would have
182. Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996).
183. Id. at 1284–85 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 1288.
185. Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1408 (“[T]his test does not provide much guidance
on how to [filter out the non-protectable elements] and offers little direction to answer the
ultimate question of whether a work has been improperly appropriated.”).
186. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (detailing the subjective
component of the “ordinary observer” analysis); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (detailing the subjective component of
the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis); Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc., 77 F.3d at 1288 (detailing the
subjective component of the abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis).
187. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990).
188. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
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found it impossible to make determinations regarding substantial
similarity.189 The court did not apply Arnstein’s bifurcated analysis,
where a finding of probative similarity is followed by the substantial
similarity analysis.190 Rather, it made one determination regarding
substantial similarity utilizing the expert testimony, and combined it with
the opinions of the lay listener.191 The court found it necessary to consider
a narrower audience in its application of the substantial similarity test
because the scope of the original work was beyond the comprehension of
the general public.192
With the shift in software cases utilizing a more focused audience as
the measure for the subjective component of the substantial similarity test,
one question was left unanswered—whether this analysis would extend to
other works of authorship, particularly music.193 Dawson v. Hinshaw
Music, Inc. was the first extension of the Intended Audience Test to music
copyright law.194
This case involved an interpretation of the spiritual song “Ezekiel
Saw de Wheel” by the international composer William Levi Dawson.195
Although the words and melody of the song were considered to be in the
public domain, Dawson obtained a registered copyright of his particular
arrangement.196 Forty years later, a secondary composer made an
arrangement of the song, and granted Hinshaw Music exclusive rights to

189. Philip C. Baxa & M. William Krasilovsky, Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc.: The
Fourth Circuit Revisits Arnstein and the “Intended Audience” Test, 1 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA
& INTELL. PROP. L.F. 91, 94–95 (1991).
190. Whelan Associates, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1232.
191. Id.
[T]he distinction between the two parts of the Arnstein test may be of doubtful value
when the finder of fact is the same person for each step: that person has been exposed
to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or ‘forget’ that
evidence in analyzing the problem under the second step. Especially in complex
cases, we doubt that ‘forgetting’ can be effective when the expert testimony is
essential to even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question.
Id.
192. See id. at 1233 (noting the imperfections in the ordinary observer test made it
inefficient in this case because of the particularly complex subject matter of computer
programs); Dawson, 905 F.2d at 735 (“[T]he advent of computer programming infringement
actions has forced courts to recognize that sometimes the non-interested or uninformed lay
observer simply lacks the necessary expertise to determine similarities or differences between
product.”).
193. See Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 189.
194. 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990).
195. Id. at 732.
196. Id.
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it.197 When Dawson became aware of this subsequent arrangement, he
filed suit for copyright infringement.198
Through the testimony of multiple experts, the district court found
substantial similarities between the two arrangements under the objective
component of the Ordinary Observer Analysis.199 When making a
determination regarding the subjective component, the court noted that the
expert testimony, which was so persuasive under the objective prong, was
now “irrelevant to and inadmissible under the second prong to show
substantial similarity constituting infringement of expression.”200
The district court did not find subjective similarity because Dawson
only supplied the sheet music for the two pieces, so the fact finder did not
have enough evidence to draw from.201 Without more, the fact finder,
acting as the “ordinary, lay observer,” did not have the necessary
knowledge about sheet music to detect requisite similarities between the
works that would constitute unlawful appropriation.202
The lack of substantial similarity was the issue on appeal.203 Here
the court adopted the Intended Audience Test as a more accurate measure
of subjective similarity:
[A]s demonstrated [by the lower court], obedience to the undisputed
principles of copyright law and the policy underlying the ordinary
observer test requires a recognition of the limits of the ordinary lay
observer characterization of the ordinary observer test. Those
principles require orientation of the ordinary observer test to the
works’ intended audience, permitting an ordinary lay observer
characterization of the test only where the lay public fairly represents
the works’ intended audience.204

The court rationalized the adoption of this standard from the
methodology used in the hallmark case, Arnstein v. Porter, which stressed
using the audience for whom the work was created as the most accurate
gauge of whether the alleged infringer took something of value from the
copyright holder.205 Using this foundation, but acknowledging the
classification as the “ordinary, lay listener” may have been overly broad,
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 733.
Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 189, at 97.
Dawson, 905 F.2d at 733.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
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the court noted:
Although Arnstein does not address the question directly, we read the
case’s logic to require that where the intended audience is significantly
more specialized than the pool of lay listeners, the reaction of the
intended audience would be the relevant inquiry. In light of the
copyright law’s purpose of protecting a creator’s market, we think it
sensible to embrace Arnstein’s command that the ultimate comparison
of the works at issue be oriented towards the works’ intended
audience.206

It is here the court shifts the traditional Ordinary Observer Analysis
to require a deeper intrinsic analysis if the works are directed to a
narrower, more specialized audience.207 As the court notes, a group
“familiar with the media at issue” should be the one to make the subjective
analysis, as utilizing a more educated audience when considering complex
subject matter avoids infringement cases turning on the opinion of
someone who is ill-informed to make a subjective determination.208
B. Dawson’s Limits
Since the Dawson decision, the Intended Audience Test has been
applied in a limited number of circumstances.209 Despite the Dawson line
of reasoning, it is precedent to find the general public as the “intended
audience,” unless the target audience possesses a specialized expertise or
specific knowledge of the work that makes its judgment a better measure
of subjective similarity.210
Since existing precedent urges courts to consider the general public
as the appropriate subjective measure, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
declined to apply the Intended Audience Test in a more recent music
copyright infringement claim.211 In Copeland v. Bieber, musician Devin
Copeland brought an infringement action against pop stars Usher and
206. Id.
207. Id. at 734–35.
208. Id. at 735.
209. See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding that where the work is child-oriented, like a costume depicting a life-sized purple
dinosaur, children are the proper audience to measure intrinsic similarity); see also Kohus v.
Mariol, 328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (extending the intended audience rule to include highly
technical patent drawings that would require interpretational guidance for the lay public to
understand).
210. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 737 (“[A] court should be hesitant to find that the lay public
does not fairly represent a work’s intended audience . . . . To warrant departure from the lay
characterization of the ordinary observer test, ‘specialized expertise’ must go beyond mere
differences in taste and instead must rise to the level of the possession of knowledge that the lay
public lacks.”).
211. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015).
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Justin Bieber, alleging three versions of their song, “Somebody to Love,”
infringed on his copyrighted work of the same name.212 On appeal,
Copeland insisted that a highly specialized group of individuals be
considered as the “intended audience,” rather than the general public.213
His argument rested on the fact that his work was meant for industry
professionals, not the “ordinary observer.”214 However, the Court was not
convinced industry professionals represented the work’s audience—
focusing only on who would make-up the “buyer” or “recipient” in the
artist’s market.215
This Note argues the Fourth Circuit should have found Copeland
deserving of a specialized group of individuals, and thus, applied the
Intended Audience Test. Although not addressed in the opinion, the
“general public,” while possibly the end recipient of the work, lacked the
specialized knowledge necessary to make a subjective evaluation in the
substantial similarity analysis.216 From the time of its creation, the
Intended Audience Test prevented an uneducated “ordinary observer”
from making subjective determinations in infringement cases, regardless
of who was considered the “buyer” of the work.217 Refusing to consider
the specialized “intended audience” of music industry professionals, the
Copeland court, caused a musically untrained and uneducated general
public to make the subjective determination, which greatly affected the
outcome of the case.218
IV.
UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MUSIC WARRANT ITS OWN
SYSTEM
A wide variety of works are covered under current copyright law,

212. Id. at 487.
213. Id. at 490.
214. Id. (“The ‘market’ Copeland was trying to reach, in other words, was the Ushers of
the world, and Copeland would be harmed if industry professionals believed his song was
substantially similar to those of the defendants even if the general public saw no resemblance.”);
see Appellants’ Opening Brief at 30, Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015) (No.
2:13-cv-00246-AWA-TEM).
215. Copeland, 789 F.3d at 491.
216. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 214, at 30.
217. See id. at 29–30.
[O]nly a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a court to embrace a
doctrine that requires a copyright case to turn on the opinion of someone who is
ignorant of the relevant differences and similarities between two works. Instead, the
judgment should be informed by people who are familiar with the media at issue.
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990).
218. Copeland, 789 F.3d at 494–95 (ruling in favor of the Appellant—even though the
general public was used as the intended audience—based on a finding that a reasonable jury
could find intrinsic similarity solely on the similar language in the choruses).
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and for the sake of uniformity, only one set of laws is imposed on them.219
However, music deserves its own copyright system, and the current
application of the test for subjective similarity should be adjusted to better
represent the functions of music today. While the “one-size-fits-all”
formulation of copyright law may have been sufficient throughout history,
sociological and technological changes in the way people create, listen to,
and perceive music brings the need for change in the law to the
forefront.220
Judicial and legislative bodies controlling how copyright law
operates are not taking into account the unique cultural and technological
processes of society’s interaction with music.221 Overlooking these
distinctive characteristics regarding the public’s production and
consumption of music, and continuing to broadly categorize it with other
forms of authorship, creates an outdated and ineffective music copyright
system.222
The Intended Audience Test should be applied in all subjective
determinations of unlawful appropriation in music copyright cases. Music
is a highly skilled and technical work of authorship, and the “ordinary
observer” lacks the knowledge necessary to make accurate determinations
of unlawful appropriation.223 By adopting the Intended Audience Test in
music copyright cases, an output of more precise infringement claims will
result, and the ineffectiveness of the Ordinary Observer Analysis in music
copyright cases will be combatted.224
A. The Current System Does Not Account for the Common Practices of
Music Production
The current copyright system, and specifically the test for substantial
similarity, punishes artists for music production resulting from modern
techniques and practices.225 Since the current system utilizes the
219. Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1384.
220. Keyes, supra note 74.
221. Id. at 419.
222. Id. at 420; see also Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism
Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 424 (1988) (arguing copyright law is a self-perpetuating cycle
that “work[s] a disservice on unestablished songwriters”).
223. Eric Rogers, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of Copyright
Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 912–
15 (2013).
224. See discussion infra Sections IV.A–C.
225. JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY 4 (The Univ. of Ga. Press, 2006).
Transformative appropriation, the act of referring to or quoting old works in order to
create a new work, has always been a key element in thriving musical cultures. Today,
appropriation connotes an exclusive or unauthorized seizure of materials. But
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subjective measure of the “ordinary observer,” who might be unaware of
common compositional characteristics of music production, imprecise
and unfair judicial decisions result.226
This highly damaging system results in artist liability for simply
adhering to industry norms.227 The adoption of the Intended Audience
Test in all music infringement analyses would combat this problem by
allowing a more skilled and experienced party, who possesses knowledge
of these production characteristics, to make the subjective determinations
present in all measures for substantial similarity.
There is no intent requirement for a copyright infringement action;
therefore, subconscious copying is actionable.228 Numerous past
infringement actions demonstrate this phenomenon229—oftentimes
involving cases where courts feel obligated to find subconscious copying
simply because they see no other explanation for the similarity.230 The
basis for this type of infringement liability “seems predicated on the
notion that copying is copying, whether done intentionally or
innocently.”231 However, previously explained characteristics of music
production exemplify why this practice unfairly punishes musicians.232
Characteristics unique to music production make it “both deserving
and in need of special consideration.”233 Music borrowing and copying
between artists, as well as the constraints of musical composition,

transformative appropriation has historically functioned in a spirit of sharing, friendly
competition, and homage.
Id.
226. See Manta, supra note 127, at 1336–37.
227. See DEMERS, supra note 225, at 7.
228. Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 268 (“The defendant’s ‘innocence’ or lack
of willful intent can certainly shield him from enhanced damages but has no bearing on the
question of whether he unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s original expression.”).
229. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (basing
defendant Bolton’s access to plaintiff’s song, even after denying ever hearing it, on its popularity
during the 1960s—almost 25 years before Bolton produced his own song); ABKCO Music, Inc.
v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding former Beatles member
liable for infringement even after he presented extensive evidence of the independent production
of his song, but admitting to hearing plaintiff’s song previously); Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (believing the defendant did not consciously copy
elements of plaintiff’s work, Judge Learned Hand felt obligated to impose liability because of
the virtual identity of a characteristic element of the two works).
230. Rebecca Skirpan, An Argument that Independent Creation is as Likely as
Subconscious Copying in Music Infringement Cases (2013) (unpublished Law Student
Scholarship, Seton Hall Law), Paper 112, http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/112.
231. Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 269.
232. See supra Subpart I.C.
233. Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 48.
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highlight the need for special consideration in terms of copyright
protection.234 Since copyright law is not in line with these creative
processes in the music industry, a severely insufficient infringement test
results.235
The need for a more tailored infringement analysis is also clear when
considering the idea-expression dichotomy of copyright protection in the
context of musical works.236 Unlike literary or poetic works, where
paraphrasing exact language can express the same idea in a lawful way,
reformulating musical works to express the same idea without infringing
expression is close to impossible.237 This idea is emphasized by the finite
number of pleasing compositions available to musicians, paired with the
limiting characteristics specific to that artist’s musical genre.238
Punishing artists for following the common practice of the music
industry by drawing inspiration and ideas from musical influences is not
an appropriate system.239 The Intended Audience Test would serve to
account for these common practices of the music industry because the
group making the subjective decisions regarding infringement would be
aware of these characteristics.
Further, the reason for adopting the Intended Audience Test also
speaks to the type of illicit copying against which copyright law is meant
to protect. In Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc., when
narrowing the audience to children because of the child-centered nature of
the work, the court stated the basis for adopting the Intended Audience
Test is to prevent against “knock-offs,” which could diminish a holder’s
economic market and potential financial returns.240
Accounting for the creator’s economic interest in his work makes the
Intended Audience Test a better measure of when an alleged infringer uses
a copyrighted work as influence or inspiration versus maliciously aiming
to gain profits from the copyrighted material.241 Malicious infringement
should always be punishable. However, when it comes to music, liability
for the utilization of influential works creates a system of fearful
234. Id.
235. Id. (“The features of musical culture and the ubiquity of musical borrowing reveal
a dramatic divergence between the shared norms and practices of music culture and a doctrinal
copyright approach.”).
236. See id. at 50–51.
237. Id. at 51 (“[A] sufficiently different musical expression will almost necessarily
express a different idea.”).
238. See supra Subpart I.C.
239. See DEMERS, supra note 225, at 5.
240. Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802 (4th Cir. 2001).
241. See Grinvalsky, supra note 167, at 423.
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musicians and individuals with a limited number of musical works to
enjoy.242
B. The Shift in Music Consumption Causes the “Ordinary Observer” to
Lack the Adequate Knowledge for Effective Subjective
Determinations
Personalized music consumption makes the need for the adoption of
the Intended Audience Test even more essential. The growing trend of
personalized music consumption through on-demand and curated
streaming services demonstrates the power of digital technology to reach
more listeners than ever before.243 However, the archaic system of
copyright law is bogging down the growth of digital music technology.
Because the current system is outdated and ineffective, it works against
digital technology by minimizing its impact and limiting creative
practices.244 As the opportunities created by the ever-expanding digital
world continue to clash with the traditional norms of copyright law, the
need for a change is evident.245
People’s appetite for music consumption has not changed, but the
way we individually tune into music can be truly unique.246 Listeners can
access the specific music they want, at the touch of a button: all due to the
advent of new digital mediums.247 The 2014 boom of music streaming,
and the continued growth into 2015, highlight how dynamic the music
landscape truly is.248 There has been a shift away from uniformity of
music consumption, and an increase in the personalization of the music

242. See DEMERS, supra note 225, at 10; Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters,
Composers, Musicians, and Producers, supra note 21 (arguing that upholding the “Blurred
Lines” verdict, whereby Williams and Thicke used Gaye’s classic as inspiration for the hit song,
the courts would essentially “eliminat[e] any meaningful standard for drawing the line between
permissible inspiration and unlawful copying,” which would be “certain to stifle creativity and
impede the creative process.”).
243. CARYS J. CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION, AND CULTURE: TOWARDS A
RELATIONAL THEORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011)
(“Digital technologies . . . have the potential to alter and subvert power structures by changing
the ways in which we access, engage with, and participate in the creation of [information]
resources”).
244. Id. (“Networked technologies present unprecedented opportunities for creative
expression and participation in public discourse; but these technologies, and the activities they
facilitate, are subject to legal regimes that allocate exclusive rights over information resources,
restricting their creation, dissemination, and development.”).
245. See id. at 1–2.
246. Everyone Listens to Music, but How We Listen is Changing, NIELSEN (Jan. 22,
2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/everyone-listens-to-music-but-howwe-listen-is-changing html [https://perma.cc/HX7Z-9YXW].
247. Id.
248. Id.
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experience.249
The more personalized nature of music consumption through online
streaming platforms greatly limits the music to which the everyday
listener is exposed.250 Music listeners now can zero-in on their preferred
taste and exclude the rest.251 This is unlike older mediums, such as radio,
where the listener is not in control of what is being played, or CDs, where
the listener was forced to purchase a “prepackaged bunch of songs.”252
The highly customized nature of the listening experience on sites like
Spotify creates blinders for the listener to focus solely on their preferred
genre or style of music.253
The assumption that the “ordinary observer” or the “general public”
is the best representation of the intended audience in musical copyright
infringement cases is inadequate because of today’s expanding digital
technology.254 With statistics proving the popularity of on-demand
streaming services, and due to the individualization of music consumption
achieved through these on-demand streaming services, not every member
of the public possesses the knowledge to decide what is illicit copying for
specific types of music.255
By listening to only what is pleasing to the individual listener, the
rest of the works in the music landscape go ignored.256 This makes a hiphop fan an inadequate measure for unlawful appropriation when it
involves two works that would fall into the genre of country or electronic
dance music.257 Each style of music has unique characteristics that only
avid listeners of that style would be able to distinguish between.258 What
may sound the same to a non-country fan might be easily recognizable as
a distinctive musical characteristic to a lover of country music.259
As a society, we value advances in digital technologies.260 The
creation of on-demand streaming services has allowed the world of music
249. See id.
250. Heath, supra note 110.
251. Id.
252. TIMOTHY D. TAYLOR, STRANGE SOUNDS: MUSIC, TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 19
(Routledge, 2001).
253. Heath, supra note 110.
254. See supra Subpart I.D.
255. Id.
256. Heath, supra note 110.
257. ROY SHUKER, POPULAR MUSIC: THE KEY CONCEPTS 99–100 (Routledge, 2nd ed.
2005).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. CRAIG, supra note 243.

34

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:001

to advance, and fans to get more out of their listening experience.
Unfortunately, with those advances, the shift in music consumption has
created an inadequate “ordinary observer.” To better cater to a world of
on-demand streaming, the Intended Audience Test should be adopted in
all music infringement cases. With the adaptation of a more effective
copyright system, technology’s power and reach will continue to
prosper.261
C. Extending the Intended Audience Test for Musical Works to Better
Promote the Main Purpose of Copyright Law
The Intended Audience Test would better support the purpose of
copyright law if applied to all music infringement cases. As previously
explained, there are two competing interests of copyright law—granting
creators rights over their works and the utilitarian function to benefit the
public domain.262 However, copyright jurisprudence is clear that a benefit
to the public domain, with a constant flow of creative works, always
outweighs the former.263
The current Ordinary Observer Analysis applied in music
infringement cases results in misguided and inaccurate subjective
determinations of substantial similarity, which can eventually have
disastrous effects on the number of creative works produced for the public
domain.264 For example, a 2014 study measured the factors used by the
fact-finder, acting as the “ordinary observer,” when making the subjective
determination in infringement cases.265 The study hypothesized that when
given additional information regarding the works and the creators’ efforts,
as well as identifying one party as the “wrongdoer,” the “ordinary
observer” found more similarities and less dissimilarities resulting in
greater plaintiff-friendly results.266 The result suggests the “ordinary
observer” is in fact sensitive to additional information presented to him,
and as a result, his subjective determination is subject to multiple
cognitive and moral biases.267 This shows the “ordinary observer” has the
potential to make inaccurate findings on substantial similarity.268

261. Id. at 1–2.
262. See supra Section I.A.3.
263. See supra Section I.A.3.
264. See DEMERS, supra note 225, at 10.
265.
See Balganesh et al., supra note 178 (testing the substantial similarity
determinations of subjects presented with a pair of images and criteria normally given to factfinders during the course of infringement actions).
266. Id. at 271.
267. Id. at 289.
268. Id.
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This study also detailed the extensive process the “ordinary
observer” embarks on when making subjective determinations.269 First,
one must determine the similarities and dissimilarities between the two
works.270 Despite seeming fairly straightforward, the “ordinary observer”
oftentimes requires more background knowledge to recognize the ways in
which the works are either similar or dissimilar, making the process quite
complex.271 Further, the nature of the discretion that goes into making a
subjective determination of what is “substantial” enough similarity creates
deviations in the standard being applied.272 In short, the nature of this
subjective analysis creates inconsistent results because the process is
inherently complex and prone to personal biases.273
Aside from inaccurate findings of substantial similarity based on
inevitable biases, the lay observer often lacks knowledge regarding the
complexities of musical composition, allowing for injudicious subjective
analyses.274 For example, due to society’s aural appreciation of music,
hearing-based evaluations can dominate subjective determinations and
confuse an actual finding of infringing expression with what might just
sound the same.275 Another musical hurdle for the “ordinary observer” is
deciding if what is musically similar is inherent due to the subject matter,
or if it actually amounts to appropriation of copyrighted material.276 For
example, many phrases in rock songs end with a “cadence” to finish off
the musical phrase and connect it smoothly with the next.277 Without a
foundational knowledge of rock music composition, the “ordinary
observer” may find similarities in the cadence of two rock songs—a wellknown characteristic to musicians and industry professionals—and use it
269. Id. at 275.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 275–76 (arguing that depending on the particular “ordinary observer” the
determination of what is considered “substantial” similarity could include anything from “more
than not” to “highly”).
273. Id. at 276 (“[T]he substantial similarity test requires jurors and judges to work
through a complex and ill-defined cognitive task, and is therefore vulnerable to biased
reasoning.”); see Manta, supra note 127, at 1338–43 (arguing the reasonable listener test is
prone to “hindsight bias,” when the fact finder is more likely to find substantial similarity once
probative copying has been established, “anchoring bias,” which occurs when the plaintiff’s
original work becomes the anchor to measure the defendant’s work against, and “confirmation
bias,” which leads the fact finder to make a determination consistent with the issue at hand).
274. Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 58.
275. Id. (“Musical laypersons are more likely to conflate [aural and musical similarity]
because of their unspecialized understanding of music.”).
276. Id.
277. WALTER EVERETT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ROCK: FROM “BLUE SUEDE SHOES” TO
“SUITE: JUDY BLUE EYES” 134–35 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).
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as a basis for finding substantial similarity.278
With an influx of plaintiff-friendly decisions regarding substantial
similarity, secondary musicians are unfairly accused for unlawful
copying.279 This could discourage the wrongfully accused, as well as
other musicians afraid of liability, from creating new music—especially
music inspired by past musical works.280 Also, in the long term, this
system creates a lower quality of musical works in the public domain
because new works lack the inspirations and influences due to the
creators’ fears of copyright liability.281
Finding substantial similarity within the specificities and
technicalities of musical composition is a task too burdensome for the
“ordinary observer” to bear.282 When a court utilizes the Intended
Audience Test rather than the traditional Ordinary Observer Analysis, a
presumption of higher skill and expertise regarding the subject matter of
the works at issue exists.283 This means the designated “intended
audience” will find similarities where the “ordinary observer” will not,
and is better qualified to determine if those similarities are the kind that
warrants a finding of unlawful appropriation.284
Erroneous infringement analyses by the “ordinary observer” hinder
the core purpose of copyright law by unduly restricting the creative
process.285 Reliance on the subjective findings of an “ordinary observer”
risks over-inclusion of creative works meant for the public domain under
278. Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 60.
279. Id. at 56 (concluding the potential biases associated with the “ordinary observer”
analysis result in decisions favoring the plaintiff claiming infringement over the defendant
tasked with refuting the claim).
280. DEMERS, supra note 225; see Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers,
Musicians, and Producers, supra note 21, at 8.
The inherent danger [in the “Blurred Lines” verdict] is that, without drawing a proper
line . . . between what is an influence and what is an infringement, future songwriters
do not know whether their “influence” is going to land them with the next hit record
or land them in court—or both, as demonstrated in this case.
Id.
281. DEMERS, supra note 225; see Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers,
Musicians, and Producers, supra note 21, at 8.
[W]hen a budding songwriter is contemplating the composition of a song, it is
axiomatic that he or she is going to think twice before he or she writes a song that
“feels” like a Marvin Gaye song or any other artist’s song, always with one foot in the
recording studio and one foot in the courtroom.
Id.
282. Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 57.
283. See supra Subpart III.A.
284. Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 58.
285. Id. at 51.
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the umbrella protection of copyright law—a grave policy concern for this
area of law.286
Also, more consistent and accurate holdings would put litigants,
judges, and critics of the current system at ease. Adopting the Intended
Audience Test in music infringement cases will not only provide more
accurate subjective determinations of substantial similarity, but also
increase the number and quality of musical works in the public domain.287
It will better promote copyright law’s ultimate goal—enriching the public
domain with quality musical works.
CONCLUSION
Imagine a world without music. Silence would ring down the aisles
as you grocery shop on Sunday mornings. Pianos would only serve as
overly elaborate coffee tables. Without musical cues, moviegoers would
be unable to detect dramatic moments. Music infiltrates almost every
facet of our world. The law must promote as much of this creative spirit
as possible. However, as the current copyright system stands, the law
cultivates the opposite effect.
Due to its unique production characteristics, music creation is
different from any other form of authorship—warranting a specialized test
for infringement. Further, as technology continues to break new ground,
music discovery and consumption are shifting to a more online platform.
While the growth of on-demand streaming services has dramatically
changed the music experience for listeners, the test for copyright
infringement has lagged behind.
The greatest concern under the current copyright regime is that by
continuing to utilize the “ordinary observer” as the subjective measure for
unlawful appropriation, the copyright system produces inaccurate
infringement results. By unfairly punishing musicians, a sense of fear is
created—fear that by trying to represent an era of music and paying
homage to a legendary musician, such as the case with “Blurred Lines,”
an artist opens himself up to the possibility of grave copyright liability.
The current copyright system jeopardizes the future of music creation.
Similar to the decision in Copeland v. Bieber,288 courts are often
reluctant when confronted with the opportunity to apply the Intended
Audience Test to music infringement cases. The creation of the Intended
Audience Test for software infringement analyses, as well as the extension
of the test to other forms of authorship, exemplifies situations where the

286.
287.
288.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 51.
789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015).
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need for specialization and expertise in the subjective measure for
unlawful appropriation is necessary. By adopting the Intended Audience
Test a more specialized group would decide the subjective measure
required in the substantial similarity analysis. This will result in a
heightened standard of analysis for infringement cases, and produce more
accurate and efficient results. Musicians will be able to create without
fear of liability, and the quality of music in the public domain would
increase significantly.

